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In an overlapping generations model, momentary equilibria are defined as points that lie
on the intergenerational oﬀer curve, i.e., they satisfy agents’ optimality conditions and market
clearing at any date. However, some dynamic sequences commencing from such points may not
be considered valid equilibria because they asymptotically violate some economic restriction of
the model. The literature has always ruled out such paths. This paper studies a pure-exchange
monetary overlapping generations economy in which real balances cycle forever between mo-
mentary equilibrium points. The novelty is to show that segments of the oﬀer curve that have
been previously ignored, can in fact be used to produce asymptotically valid cyclical paths. In-
deed, a cycle can bestow dynamic validity on momentary equilibrium points that had erstwhile
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The best thing about the future is that it only comes one day at a time.
Abraham Lincoln
1 Introduction
Almost a half century of research has gone into studying stationary and non-stationary equilibria
generated by a standard pure-exchange two-period lived overlapping generations (OG) model.
The textbook version of this model economy is populated by two-period lived agents endowed
with the single consumption good when young and who receive utility from consumption over
their lifetimes, as captured by a strictly concave and time-separable utility function. There may
be an initial old generation endowed with fiat currency, and this asset becomes the sole means by
which agents shift resources over time. As discussed in Azariadis (1993), the law of motion for real
balances (intergenerational oﬀer curve) for the standard “Samuelson case” has two steady states,
one at zero and one at a positive level. The non-monetary (monetary) steady state is locally
stable (unstable). Any sequence of real balances starting to the left of the monetary steady state
eventually converges to the non-monetary steady state; paths to the right are ruled out because
asymptotically, they require agents to hold real balances beyond what their endowment would
allow.1
In this paper, we distinguish between two types of equilibria in the standard OG model with
money described above. Momentary equilibria are points that lie on the intergenerational oﬀer
curve, i.e., they satisfy agents’ optimality conditions and market clearing at any date. However,
some dynamic sequences starting from such points may not be presumed valid because they would
eventually violate some economic restriction of the model (such as, real balances have to stay
bounded above by a young agent’s endowment, and so on). If there exists an asymptotically valid
sequence commencing at a momentary equilibrium point, that point will be called a “dynamically
valid equilibrium” point, and the sequence, a “dynamically valid equilibrium sequence”. Note that
our notion of a momentary equilibrium is distinct from that of a temporary equilibrium (Grand-
mont, 2007). In a temporary equilibrium, markets clear at any date conditional on expectations
of future prices which need not be market clearing ones. 2
1More complicated dynamical patterns in monetary OG models seem to require substantial deviations from the
standard paradigm. Researchers such as Grandmont (1985) have studied non-stationary monetary equilibria in OG
models and established a strong set of conditions (such as backward bending oﬀer curves) needed for two-period
cycles to emerge endogenously. Higher order cycles (which have the potential to replicate realistic time series for
nominal variables in stylized models) require conditions that are even more restrictive than those required to generate
two period cycles. For further discussion, see Bullard and Duﬀy (1998), Bunzel (2006), and Koskela and Puhakka
(2006).
2Momentary equilibria are the same as perfect foresight temporary equilibria.
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Figure 1: The time map f (.)
A picture would no doubt illuminate further. Consider a first-order discrete dynamical system
xt+1 = f (xt) where x is an economic variable of interest in some model, t denotes time, and
f (xt) summarizes all points that satisfy agents’ optimality and market clearing conditions at any
date. Assume that economic restrictions require x to stay below x+; also assume that the unique
steady state (x∗) is locally stable. In Figure 1, momentary equilibria are points on the entire curve
IV . The literature has typically ruled out segments such as I+I as being dynamically invalid (see
the discussion surrounding Figure 5.10 in Blanchard and Fischer, 1989) deeming only the solid
segment DV as dynamically valid. 3 After all, starting at any point such as C on the dashed curve
I+I and travelling exclusively along that path towards I will generate a dynamic sequence that
eventually takes xt beyond x+.
However, as shown in the figure, an equilibrium can be constructed in which the economy
cycles forever between points C,A, and B; this renders C dynamically valid because the cycle
CAB always stays in the economically valid range! A major contribution of this paper is to show
that segments of the intergenerational oﬀer curve (such as I+I) that may have been previously
considered invalid, can in fact, be used to produce dynamically valid cyclical paths (such as CAB).4
3Note that at point D, the slope is -1. Since x∗ is locally stable, sequences that start to the left of x∗(but right
of D) and to the right of x∗, eventually converge to x∗. Such points are dynamically valid, because they stay within
the range (0, x+). Points to the left of D get attracted towards I and beyond, taking them outside the range (0, x+).
4Points such as C become dynamically valid if agents believe, correctly, that at some date the economy will
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We illustrate this fairly general idea using a simple OG model of money. Specifically, the
paper introduces exogenous minimum consumption requirements on young and old agents into
the textbook overlapping generations model with money as the only asset. Agents get utility from
consumption only if it exceeds a certain minimum level (often identified with subsistence). We
characterize the set of perfect-foresight monetary momentary and dynamically valid equilibria in
the model economy. While analytical progress is hindered by the lack of a closed form solution for
the equilibrium law of motion for real balances, it is still possible to show that there is a unique
monetary steady state. We show that three — and higher — period cycles exist. As is well known,
such multi-periodic equilibria may represent time paths for variables which closely resemble their
real world counterparts.5 The model economy generates high order cycles for a wide range of the
parameter space. Also, if the minimum consumption requirement on the consumption of the old is
removed, the economy studied would not produce any cyclical equilibria beyond periodicity two.
In fact, our sole purpose of introducing the minimum consumption requirement is to generate a
non-monotonic time map for real balances and exploit this non-monotonicity to generate cyclical
paths.
The cycles in our model are interesting because they represent periodic behavior of real bal-
ances among momentary equilibrium points, some of which would have been labeled “dynamically
invalid” and ruled out in the aforediscussed literature on cycles in OG models. The novelty here is
to show that such previously-ignored momentary equilibria can get “resurrected” if, for example,
they are part of a cycle. In other words, a cycle can bestow dynamic validity on momentary equi-
librium points (such as C above) that had erstwhile been classified as dynamically invalid. And
while the main premise of the paper is made within the context of an OG model with money, there
is no reason to believe that in principle, a similar argument cannot be made for models without
money.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the model and computes
the law of motion for real balances. Section 3 shows uniqueness of the steady state while Section
4 studies the possibility of periodic behavior. Section 5 concludes.
return to the downward sloped portion of the oﬀer curve, thereby preventing the sequence of money balances from
extending beyond the feasible set. Incidentally, it is strictly not necessary that the path be a cycle. One can imagine
paths that “bounce oﬀ” the upward sloping segment onto the segment DV and then converge to the steady state, x∗.
Our thesis, however, is illustrated best with a cyclical path. Parenthetically, also note that it is not necessary that
starting at B, the economy must go to C; it could, for example, go on to a point on the segment DV and eventually
converge to x∗. All we are claiming is that it may be possible to construct an equilibrium cyclical sequence BCA
which would resurrect the dynamic validity of C.
5Our model economy, for example, has the ability to produce time paths for inflation which have the property
that in the short run, moderate inflation is followed by a sharp deflation and then a huge inflation.
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2 The model
The economy consists of an infinite sequence of two-period lived overlapping generations of agents
of unit mass. Let t = 1, 2, ... index time. At each date t, a new generation appears. Each two-
period-lived agent is endowed with w > 0 units of the good when young and nothing when old.
Let ct (xt) denote the consumption of the final good by a representative young (old) agent born
at t. All such agents have preferences representable by the utility function u (ct, xt) where u is
twice-continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave in its arguments and
where
u (ct, xt) ≡
(ct − θt)1−σ
1− σ +
β (xt − δt)1−σ
1− σ , β, σ > 0. (1)
Here, θt and δt represent the exogenous minimum consumption requirement the agent faces when
young and old respectively. For all that we do below, we will assume θt = θ > 0 and δt = δ > 0
∀t. As will become evident below, θ plays a marginal role in the analysis presented below but is
included here for completeness sake. The parameter β captures the relative importance of old-age
utility relative to young-age utility.
It is important to point out that 1/σ does not have the standard interpretation of the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution. In dynamic models of continuous time, the elasticity is often written
as  = −u0 (ct) /u00 (ct) ct. With a standard period utility with minimum consumption γ, u (c− γ),
 = (c− γ) /σc. This term is increasing in consumption c and lies in the interval (0, 1/σ). For
finite-time horizons, where the time interval between periods is not small — as in the case of
an OG model — the elasticity can be expressed as a weighted average of the first and second
period consumptions, (ζ (ct − θ) /σct + (1− ζ) (c2t+1 − δ) /σc2t+1) . Of course, when θ = δ = 0, 
is constant and equal to 1/σ.6
Agents have access to a competitive market for fiat currency, the sole asset in this economy.
The quantity of money in circulation at the end of period t ≥ 1, per young agent, is fixed and
denotedM . Let 0 < pt <∞ denote the price level at date t and pt+1pt ≡ πt denote the inflation rate
between period t and t + 1. Then the gross real rate of return on money (Rt+1) between period
t and t + 1 is given by Rt+1 ≡ pt/pt+1 = 1πt . Also, let mt ≡ M/pt denote real money balances at
date t. Using the definitions for m and R, it is easily checked that Rt+1 =
mt+1
mt .
The agent’s problem at date t is simply to choose positive first and second period consumption
that maximize (1) subject to the budget constraints ct = w−mt, xt = Rt+1mt and the constraints
6The intertemporal elasticity of substitution may not be unique in cases with non-homothetic preferences, as
considered here. The problem stems from the fact that there may not be a one-to-one mapping between the ratio
of the marginal utilities and the ratio of consumptions. Typically, the elasticity is simply reported as (c− γ) /σc.
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on minimum consumption, ct ≥ θt and xt ≥ δt, taking Rt+1 as given. The first order condition is
given by
xt − δt
ct − θt
= (βRt+1)
1
σ .
Incorporating the budget constraints, this can be written as
mt+1 − δ
w −mt − θ
= β
1
σ
µ
mt+1
mt
¶ 1
σ
∀t > 1. (2)
The non-negativity constraints on consumption place the restrictions ct ≥ θ and xt ≥ δ for all t.
Using the agent’s first and second period budget constraints, these amount to assuming
δ ≤ mt ≤ w − θ, (A.1)
for all t; (A.1) will be called the “valid range”. 7
3 Steady state equilibria
We restrict ourselves to cases in which mt ∈ <++∀t ≥ 1. All competitive equilibria satisfy (2).
A momentary equilibrium at any date t represents a pair (mt,mt+1) that satisfies the diﬀerence
equation (2) and (A.1). Any sequence of momentary equilibrium points {mt}∞t=1 with mt ∈
(δ, w − θ) for all t ≥ 1 will be called a dynamically valid equilibrium sequence; each mt in this
sequence is a dynamically valid equilibrium point.
Setting mt+1 = mt = m∗ > 0 in (2), it is easy to check that the unique positive steady state
is given by
m∗ =
δ + (w − θ)β 1σ
1 + β
1
σ
> 0. (3)
It will evidently be useful to know if the diﬀerence equation implied by (2) is monotonic.
Straightforward diﬀerentiation of (2) establishes
dmt+1
dmt
= −
µ
mt+1
mt
¶ 1
σ
β
1
σ
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
1 + 1σ
(w −mt − θ)
mt
1− 1σ
(mt+1 − δ)
(mt+1)
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ . (4)
From (4), it follows that the denominator of the term inside the square brackets can be positive
or negative depending on whether
1− 1
σ
(mt+1 − δ)
mt+1
≶ 0⇔ 1 ≶ 1
σ
(mt+1 − δ)
mt+1
.
7The constraint xt ≥ δ imposes that Rt+1mt ≥ δ. Since Rt+1mt = mt+1, the requirement xt ≥ δ translates into
mt+1 ≥ δ. (A.1) follows from the fact that the minimum consumption constraint holds every period and specifically,
that xt−1 ≥ δ.
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Note that if δ = 0, the oﬀer curve is monotonic, the sign of its first derivative depending on σ.
As pointed out, its sign is independent of the minimum consumption constraint on consumption
when young, θ, for all values of mt in the valid range.
Define mˇ as
mˇ ≡ δ
1− σ > 0 if σ < 1.
The following result is then immediate.
Proposition 1 When σ < 1, for mt+1 > mˇ,
dmt+1
dmt > 0 holds, and for mt+1 < mˇ,
dmt+1
dmt < 0
holds. At mt+1 = mˇ,
¯¯¯
dmt+1
dmt
¯¯¯
=∞. When σ > 1, dmt+1dmt < 0 for all mt,mt+1 in the valid range.
In other words, when σ < 1, the possibility arises that the intergenerational oﬀer curve given
by (2) is non-monotonic. As is well known, a necessary (but not suﬃcient) condition for complex
dynamics (cycles of order higher than two, etc.) is that the slope of the oﬀer curve change sign.
Henceforth, we restrict our attention to σ < 1.8 In this case, the oﬀer curve described implicitly by
(2) is a correspondence in the forward dynamics, in much the same fashion as shown in Figure 1.
In the standard model without minimum consumption requirements, as discussed in Grandmont
(1985) and Boldrin and Woodford (1992), the oﬀer curve bends backwards for very high returns
to money (measured by the ratio mt+1/mt), due to the fact that the income eﬀect of an increase
in the return dominates the substitution eﬀect. In the present case, the situation is reversed; the
oﬀer curve bends backwards for low returns on money.
Heuristically, when the interest rate is low, the agent must hold large cash balances in order
to ensure that his consumption when old will exceed the minimum δ. Further reductions in the
return on money forces him to hold even more cash to satisfy the minimum. However, holding
more cash balances puts him closer to the young-age minimum consumption requirement, θ. The
return can fall only so low — to δ/ (w − θ), to be exact — for at that return the agent holds w − θ
in real balances and he just meets the young and old age minimum consumption requirements (θ
and δ, respectively). This describes, intuitively, the downward sloped portion of the oﬀer curve.
Much the same thing happens initially along the upward sloped part of the curve. For low cash
balances, the return mt+1/mt as measured along this portion of the curve may fall, despite the
fact that mt+1 is rising. Facing falling returns, the agent compensates by holding more balances
mt in order to exceed the consumption minimum δ. At some point, however, further reductions
in young-age consumption must be accompanied by a higher return; the oﬀer curve then reflects
8When σ > 1, it is easily checked that (2) is downward sloping everywhere. In that case, it is possible to check
that two (but no higher) period cycles around m∗ are potentially possible.
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the typical positive relationship between saving and rate of return.9
It will be readily apparent that more information on the various configurations of (2), and on
the position of the steady state relative to the turning point (mˇ) will be useful below. To that end,
note that our focus is restricted to mt+1 ≥ δ and mt ≤ w − θ (see (A.1) above). When mt+1 = δ,
(2) yields mt = w − θ in the valid range for mt; similarly, when mt = w − θ, (2) yields mt+1 = δ.
This gives us the endpoints of the oﬀer curve.
If m∗ > mˇ holds, the steady state m∗ is on the upward sloping portion of the oﬀer curve
implying the slope at the steady state is positive and greater than 1. The condition m∗ > mˇ can
be expressed as
δ + (w − θ)β 1σ
1 + β
1
σ
>
δ
1− σ ⇐⇒ β
1
σ >
δσ
(1− σ) (w − θ)− δ . (5)
The following lemma is then immediate.
Lemma 1 Define m˜ as mt+1 (m˜) = δ1−σ . Then m˜ ≥
δ
1−σ ⇔
σδ
((1−σ)(w−θ)−δ) ≤ β
1
σ or m˜ ≥ δ1−σ
holds under (5).
Notice that m˜ is the mt-coordinate of the turning point mt+1 = δ1−σ ≡ mˇ. Also, m˜ ≥
δ
1−σ
holds under exactly the same condition as for the steady state to be on the upward sloping part
of the curve. Note also then, that in this case mt ∈ [m˜, w − θ] and m˜ exceeds mˇ ≡ δ1−σ . This is
depicted in Figure 2a.
9As noted, as mt approaches the maximum w − θ, the agent must be compensated with increasingly higher
returns in order to compensate for the decrease in young-age utility; this is reflected in the shape of the upper
portion of the oﬀer curve. This, however, does not occur along the downward portion of the curve. Here, the
additional consumption the agent receives when old from holding an extra unit of cash goes a long way. The agent’s
consumption when old is close to the minimum δ, so the marginal gain in utility when old from holding an additional
unit of cash is large and compensates for the large loss in utility when young as mt approaches its upper bound (ct
approaches θ).
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Figure 2a: Eq. (2) with the steady state on the upward sloping portion.
The steady state m∗, shown on the figure by a pink dot, is locally unstable. It follows that it is
not possible to travel exclusively along the path described by the upward (or downward) sloping
portion of the oﬀer curve and stay in the economically valid region forever. Put diﬀerently, any of
the momentary equilibrium points on the upward or downward sloping portion of the oﬀer curve
cannot by itself generate a dynamic sequence (along the oﬀer curve) that stays asymptotically in
[δ,w − θ].
In Figure 2b, the steady state m∗ is on the downward sloping portion of (2) and δ < m˜ < mˇ.
In other words, the turning point (m˜) occurs to the left of δ/ (1− σ) but still to the right of δ.
This means that for mt ∈ [m˜, w − θ] , the corresponding mt+1 will lie in the valid range of [δ,∞) .
As in Figure 1, it is not possible to travel exclusively along the path described by the upward
sloping portion of the oﬀer curve and stay in the economically valid region forever. Additionally,
if the steady state is locally unstable (see Proposition 2), the same would be true of points on the
downward sloping segment as well.
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Figure 2b: Eq. (2) with the steady state on the downward sloping portion.
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Figure 2c: Eq. (2) with the steady state on the downward sloping portion and m˜ < δ.
Finally, in Figure 2c, the unique steady state is again on the downward sloping segment of the
law of motion; additionally m˜ is now to the left of δ. The implication is that formt ∈ [m˜, w − θ] , the
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corresponding mt+1 will no longer lie in the valid range of [δ,∞) . Hence, there is a discontinuity at
mt = δ (marked on the figure by a dashed curve). This case in particular perhaps best illustrates
our main point — the upper selection of the correspondence describing points that satisfy (2) is
completely disconnected from its more familiar lower half, and, as in the previous cases, iterates
of this mapping will not generate sequences that stay in the economically valid region forever.
Before closing this section, we consider the local stability properties of the steady state. Note
that if the steady state is stable in the forward dynamics, it is unstable in the backward dynamics.
Proposition 2 If
A) δ ≤ β
1
σ (1−σ)(w−θ)
σ+β
1
σ
holds, m∗ is unstable and lies on the upward sloping segment (as in Figure
2a).
B)
σ(w−θ)

β
1
σ
2
+(2−σ)(w−θ)β1/σ
σ+(2−σ)β1/σ ≤ δ,holds, m
∗ is stable and lies on the downward sloping segment
(as in Figure 2b or 2c).
C) β
1
σ (1−σ)(w−θ)
σ+β
1
σ
≤ δ ≤
σ(w−θ)

β
1
σ
2
+(2−σ)(w−θ)β1/σ
σ+(2−σ)β1/σ holds, m
∗ is unstable and lies on the downward
sloping segment.
As evident from the three cases A) - C) in Proposition 2, the level of δ (the minimum con-
sumption requirement facing the old) matters crucially. When δ is low enough, the unique steady
state is unstable on the upward sloping part of the oﬀer curve. Beyond that, the steady state is
on the downward sloping portion; in the intermediate range, it is locally unstable, and in the high
range, it is locally stable (unstable in the backward dynamics).
Before proceeding, it is useful to summarize the salient features of our results. Thus far, we
have shown that there is a unique steady state level of real balances. The dynamic law of motion
for real balances is non-monotonic (it is a correspondence in the normal forward dynamics) opening
up the possibility for complex dynamics. Three separate configurations are possible: a) the steady
state is on the upward sloping segment of the law of motion, b) the steady state is on the downward
sloping segment of the law of motion and the turning point is in the valid range of real balances,
c) the steady state is again on the downward sloping segment but there is a discontinuity because
the turning point is outside the aforementioned valid range. In each case it is not possible to travel
exclusively along the path described by the upward sloping portion of the oﬀer curve and stay in
the economically valid region forever. Such momentary equilibrium points (such as those on the
upward sloping portion of the oﬀer curve) have traditionally been ruled out by standard textbook
treatments and in the literature. In the next section, we study the possibility of cycles among
such momentary equilibria and show that they may be indeed be dynamically valid as part of a
periodic sequence.
11
4 Periodic equilibria
For most of this section, we focus on 3-period cycle equilibria. These are conveniently summarized
by a triplet (ma,mb,mc), ma 6= mb 6= mc, with elements satisfying (A.1), and together, the system
of equations:
mb − δ
w −ma − θ
= β
1
σ
µ
mb
ma
¶ 1
σ
(6)
mc − δ
w −mb − θ
= β
1
σ
µ
mc
mb
¶ 1
σ
ma − δ
w −mc − θ
= β
1
σ
µ
ma
mc
¶ 1
σ
which represent the respective first-order conditions (2) for each date. Trivially, the steady state
satisfies (6) with ma = mb = mc = m∗.
More generally, when the oﬀer curve is continuous, the existence of a homoclinic orbit around
the steady-state ensures the existence of cycles of all orders.10 To that end, in Figure 3, we
illustrate such an orbit for our system.11 Notice that the steady state is locally unstable in the
backward dynamics. On the homoclinic orbit, a path that is repelled away from the steady state
eventually gets attracted to it.
 
mt
mt+1 
Figure 3: A homoclinic orbit.
10A homoclinic point lies in the neighborhood of a unstable steady state and converges to the steady state after n
iterations. A homoclinic orbit is non-degenerate if its slope is bounded away from zero. Devaney (1989) establishes
that if a map f admits a non-degenerate homoclinic point to the steady state, then in every neighborhood of the
steady state f admits periodic orbits of periodicity 2k, where k = 1, 2, .... In our case, these periodic orbits must
include points located on both the upward and the downward segments of the oﬀer curve.
11For the parameter configuration used in Example 1, a homoclinic orbit is given by 0.141, 0.101, 0.264, and 0.115
(the steady state).
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The following examples illustrate some of the salient features of our model. The first thing
to note is that since the steady state on the upward sloping segment of the oﬀer curve is locally
unstable in Figure 2a, no cycles are possible under that configuration. We now illustrate some
periodic sequences that are possible in the configurations described in Figures 2b and 2c. In each
of these cases, the steady state is locally stable in the forward dynamics.
Example 1 Suppose δ = 0.1, w = 1, θ = 0.1, β = 0.2528, and σ = 0.35. Then, the economy cycles
forever between real balance levels, 0.10012, 0.14863, and 0.45002. The steady state level of real
balances is given by m∗ = 0.11540 and mˇ = 0.15385. The law of motion is continuous (m˜ = .10001)
and is depicted (not to scale) in Figure 4.
.45002 
.14863 
.10007 
     δ/(1-σ) = .15284 
.10007 .45002 .14863 mt
mt+1 
A
B
C
Figure 4: The three-period cycle in Example 1 (not to scale).
In the economy of Example 1, real balances cycle forever between CAB as depicted in Figure
3. The sequence CAB constitutes a dynamically valid equilibrium since points C,A, and B satisfy
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(A.1). The previous literature would have ruled out point C, since it lies on the dynamically
invalid portion of the oﬀer curve. Consequently, the possibility of CAB being a dynamically valid
equilibrium would similarly have been ignored. Interestingly, it is the very existence of the cycle
that resurrects the dynamic validity of point C. Therein lies the essence of this paper.12
It is fairly easy to generate cycles of periodicity higher than three in this environment.13
Example 2 (5-period cycle) For the parametric specification outlined in Example 1, the economy
cycles forever between real balance levels, 0.1039, 0.1290, 0.3387, 0.1003, and 0.1640.
We close this section with an example of a three-period cycle for the case in which the law of
motion is discontinuous.
Example 3 Suppose δ = 0.15, w = 1, θ = 0, β = 0.42, and σ = 0.2.Then, the economy cycles
between real balance levels, 0.15006, 0.21087, and 0.39847. The steady state level of real balances
is given by m∗ = 0.16096 and mˇ = .18750. The law of motion is discontinuous (as in Figure 2c)
since m˜ = .14710 < δ = 0.15. The example is depicted in Figure 5.14
12We are not claiming the economy must transgress to a point on the upward sloped portion of the curve, such as
point C in our example. Whenmt = .14863, there is a perfectly valid momentary equilibrium value formt+1 < .14863
on the downward sloped part of the oﬀer curve. This sort of equilibrium sequence - one restricted to the downward
sloped part of the curve - converges asymptotically to the steady state m∗ = 0.11540.
13The celebrated Li-Yorke theorem does not apply here since the law of motion does not map a compact interval
onto itself. Hence, establishing topological chaos via the “Li-Yorke route” is not possible.
14 Incidentally, it is possible that an economy can support multiple 3-period cycles. For instance, a cycle with real
balances 0.15040, 0.17125, and 0.28264 is an equilibrium for the economy described in Example 3. This result does
not stem from the discontinuity in the oﬀer curve: the 3-period cycle 0.10007, 0.15817, and 0.50723 obtains for the
Example 2 economy.
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Figure 5: A three-period cycle for the economy in Example 3
Figure 4 illustrates the major contribution of the paper. It presents two separate segments of
the intergenerational oﬀer curve. On its own, the disjoint upward sloping segment would have
been ruled out in the previous literature. Together with the downward sloping portion, however,
they allow for the possibility of a dynamically valid cyclical sequence, such as BCA. Such a cycle
bestows dynamical validity to points such as A and B.
5 Concluding remarks
A substantial amount of research has sought to understand the role of nonlinearity and periodic
behavior in monetary macroeconomic models. Much of it has focussed on the possibility of gen-
erating periodic equilibria in reasonable-looking environments. To the best of our knowledge, all
existing work in this area has restricted its attention on what Aguiar-Conraria and Shell (2006)
call “long-run perfect foresight” equilibria. These are equilibrium sequences that stay economi-
cally valid asymptotically and expectations of agents on such paths are always fulfilled. A central
point of Aguiar-Conraria and Shell (2006) is that this notion of notion of long-run perfect foresight
equilibrium may be “too rigid” in an OG model where agents currently alive have to “predict the
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market behavior of all future generations”. In their setup, there is a bubble that bursts eventually
in that agents’ expectations are ultimately unmet, but for a long while, expectations are fulfilled.
In our present case, there may be cyclical paths on which the money bubble does not asymptot-
ically burst, paths that would have been ignored by the previous literature. These paths contain
momentary equilibrium points located along the upward sloped selection of the correspondence
described implicitly by (2). Such points become dynamically valid precisely because agents believe
that at some date, the economy will return to the downward sloped portion of the oﬀer curve,
thereby preventing the sequence of money balances from extending beyond the feasible set.
Though we haven’t discussed it in this paper, cycles among momentary equilibria are more
prevalent when a government that finances a deficit by seigniorage is introduced into the model.
Indeed, it is possible to produce examples of economies where cycles obtain only when there is some
positive level of seigniorage-financed government spending. Additionally, it appears a framework
similar to ours should be capable of generating interesting chaotic and sunspot equilibria. Both
seem potential avenues for further study.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 2
A) The proof of Proposition 2 A) follows from Lemma 1 along with the fact that the lim
mt→w−θ
dmt+1
dmt =
∞. This latter point can be noted by rewriting (2) as
mt+1 − δ
m
1
σ
t+1
= β
1
σ
µ
1
mt
¶ 1
σ
(w −mt − θ)
The left-hand side is approximately m
1− 1σ
t+1 for large values of mt+1. When mt = w − θ, the
right-hand side equals 0, so it follows that lim
mt→w−θ
mt+1 =∞ when σ < 1.
B) and C) On the downward sloping part of the oﬀer curve,
β
1
σ ≤ σδ
((1− σ) (w − θ)− δ) ⇔
β
1
σ (1− σ) (w − θ)
σ + β
1
σ
≤ δ (7)
holds. The steady state is stable when
dmt+1
dmt
|m∗ > −1,
or
dmt+1
dmt
|m∗ + 1 > 0.
Using (4) and the expression for m∗,
w −m∗ − θ = w − θ − δ
1 + β
1
σ
the slope condition reduces to
dmt+1
dmt
|m∗ + 1 =
−
∙
1
σβ
1/σ
µ
w−θ−δ
1+β
1
σ
1+β
1
σ
δ+(w−θ)β 1σ
¶
+ 1+β
1
σ
w−θ−δ
µ
δ+(w−θ)β 1σ
1+β
1
σ
− δ
¶¸
1− β
1/σ
σ
µ
w−θ−δ
1+β
1
σ
1+β
1
σ
δ+(w−θ)β 1σ
¶ + 1
which reduces further to
dmt+1
dmt
|m∗ + 1 =
1− 2β
1/σ
σ
µ
(w−θ−δ)
δ+(w−θ)β 1σ
¶
− β 1σ
1− β
1/σ
σ
µ
(w−θ−δ)
δ+(w−θ)β 1σ
¶ .
Note that the denominator is positive, since
1− β
1/σ
σ
Ã
(w − θ − δ)
δ + (w − θ)β 1σ
!
> 0⇔ β1/σ < σδ
((1− σ) (w − θ)− δ)
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which holds on the downward sloping part of the oﬀer curve under (7). What remains, then is to
find conditions under which the numerator is positive. When this holds, the steady state will be
stable. It is easy to check that
1− 2β
1/σ
σ
Ã
(w − θ − δ)
δ + (w − θ)β 1σ
!
− β 1σ > 0⇔ δ >
σ (w − θ)
³
β
1
σ
´2
+ (2− σ) (w − θ)β1/σ
σ + (2− σ)β1/σ
and that (7) implies
β
1
σ (1− σ) (w − θ)
σ + β
1
σ
>
σ (w − θ)
³
β
1
σ
´2
+ (2− σ) (w − θ)β1/σ
σ + (2− σ)β1/σ
never obtains.
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